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INTRODUCTION
Preston Joy relies on the facts and arguments in his opening brief, and will not
repeat those here, but he does wish to take this opportunity to respond to the following
topics raised in the State’s brief: (1) res judicata as an alternative ground for dismissal of
the motion to disqualify the district judge in the post‐conviction matter; (2) the State’s
request to affirm the district judge on different grounds than his incorrect ruling that
Counts I to IV were untimely; and (3) the level of “prejudice” that is necessary to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to disqualify the judge
automatically after reversal on appeal.
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REPLY ISSUES

I.
Res judicata was not a proper basis on which to resolve the motion to disqualify Judge
Mitchell in the post‐conviction matter.

II.
This Court should not correct Judge Mitchell’s error in dismissing certain claims as
untimely by affirming on alternative grounds.

III.
Mr. Joy need not allege and prove that, had his counsel filed a timely motion for
automatic disqualification, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been
acquitted at the second trial.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Res judicata was not a proper basis on which to resolve the motion to disqualify
Judge Mitchell in the post‐conviction matter.
In its brief, the State asserts that the district court dismissed Mr. Joy’s motion to
disqualify Judge Mitchell from presiding in the post‐conviction matter, in part, on the
ground of res judicata, and that Mr. Joy “does not appear to challenge this ruling on
appeal.” (Brief of Respondent, p. 6.)
Judge Mitchell reached the merits of this claim after mentioning, initially and
without elaboration, that he was denying it “in part [on] stare decisis.” (Tr. Hearing of
1/9/17, p. 42, ln. 13‐15.) Res judicata or “stare decisis” was not a material part of his
ruling, since he went on to address the merits. That is why Mr. Joy argued this issue the
way he did in his opening brief. In any case, he disagrees that his argument failed to
encompass all aspects of the ruling. He clearly framed the issue as: “The district court
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Joy’s motion for disqualification in the post‐
conviction action.” (Brief of Appellant, p. 8.)
“Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805
(2002). “Under principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the
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merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action
between the same parties upon the same claim.” Id. (citation omitted).
This was not the “same claim.” Judge Mitchell’s bias, or lack thereof, was not
frozen in time. Circumstances and facts change. Simply because he ruled on a previous
motion to disqualify in a related criminal matter does not mean that that ruling stands
in a new civil proceeding. Notably, Mr. Joy and his post‐conviction counsel offered new
information not contained in the previous motion that Judge Mitchell had denied in the
criminal matter. These included Judge Mitchell’s comments at the second sentencing
hearing and the fact that the Judge sentenced Mr. Joy to nine years fixed, with one year
indeterminate “as an incentive for good institutional behavior.” (Tr., Hearing of 1/9/17,
p. 38, ln. 5‐21.) Mr. Joy took that as sarcastic comment since he would be required to
serve at least 90% of the maximum sentence. (Id.) Also, Judge Mitchell denied Mr. Joy
and opportunity to present live testimony to make a record and supplement his motion
in the post‐conviction matter. (Tr., Hearing of 1/9/17, p. 18, ln. 24‐25; p. 19, ln 1‐5.)
This was a new claim by the time of the post‐conviction action. Mr. Joy had a
renewed due process right to a fair and impartial judge in the post‐conviction
proceeding. To the extent that res judicata was material to the ruling below, it was an
improper alternative basis on which to dismiss the motion.
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II.
This Court should not correct Judge Mitchell’s error in dismissing certain claims as
untimely by affirming on alternative grounds.
As to Issue II in the Brief of Appellant, the State concedes that the district court
erred in concluding that all claims related to the first trial were untimely. (Brief of
Respondent, p. 13.) Judge Mitchell did not rely on any alternative grounds to dismiss
those claims, but the State nonetheless claims that mootness and res judicata (as to
Count II, which the State asserts was resolved on appeal) were raised in its motion for
summary dismissal in the district court and are proper grounds on which to affirm. (Id.)
The Court should not be persuaded, at least as to claims that Mr. Joy’s allegations
that his counsel were conflicted and ineffective in failing to assert his right to a speedy
trial (Counts I and IV). Success on those claims would mean that his attorneys
unreasonably failed to preserve a right that, had it been asserted and granted, would
have resulted in dismissal of the case. The remedy, then, would not be the new trial that
Mr. Joy already received after remand from the first appeal. It would have been
dismissal. Those claims were not moot.
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III.
Mr. Joy need not allege and prove that, had his counsel filed a timely motion for
automatic disqualification, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been
acquitted at the second trial.
The State concedes in its brief that Mr. Joy alleged unreasonably deficient
performance by his attorney for failing to file a motion for automatic disqualification of
Judge Mitchell after the appellate reversal. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 15‐16.) But the
State claims that Mr. Joy has not alleged sufficient prejudice because he did not
demonstrate how the result of the second trial would have been different had the
motion been filed and granted. (Id. at 16.)
As he argued in his opening brief, Mr. Joy reasserts that the procedural stage at
issue was the selection of the presiding judge, and the outcome of that stage was
affected by counsel’s failure to file a successful motion. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 20‐21.)
Idaho has chosen to confer on parties a right to automatic disqualification of the
presiding judge when certain timeliness requirements have been met. The right to
disqualify a judge should therefore be deemed structural in nature, and structural error
is not readily susceptible to a prejudice analysis. Perhaps another way to think of this
issue is, if counsel had filed a timely motion and if Judge Mitchell had denied the
motion, the Idaho Supreme Court would have reversed on direct appeal regardless
whether Mr. Joy could show prejudice. See State v. Shafer, 112 Idaho 1024, 1027, 739 P.2d
6

323, 326 (1987) (“Because the [automatic disqualification] motion was denied below, we
must reverse and remand this case for a new trial.”).
If the Court does require some additional showing of prejudice beyond the
success of the motion, however, it should focus on the reliability of the proceeding and
not on the likelihood of an acquittal. See, e.g., Thompson v. Florida, 990 So.2d 482 (Fla.
2008) (holding that prejudice within the context of failing to file a motion to disqualify a
judge means “a demonstration that the result of the proceeding has been rendered
unreliable, and our confidence in the outcome of a proceeding has been undermined by
counsel’s deficiency.”). Regardless whether the Court determines that Judge Mitchell
was actually biased or even appeared to be biased by the time of the second trial, the
Court should have enough of a concern for all the reasons cited that it should not have
confidence in the fairness and reliability of the second trial and sentencing. At the very
least, it is reasonably probable that a different judge would not have sentenced Mr. Joy
to the maximum sentence of 10 years for this charge, with parole eligibility only one
year before completion as a supposed “incentive for good institutional behavior.” The
district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim without further development.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Joy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment
and remand for further proceedings in front of a different assigned judge.
Respectfully submitted on this 26th day of March 2018.
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Craig H. Durham
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This Reply Brief has been served on the following on this 26th day of March
2018, via email and by depositing copies in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid and
addressed to:

RUSSELL SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
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